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Abstract 
Over two centuries, Colombia transferred vast quantities of land, equivalent to the entire UK landmass, 
mainly to landless peasants. And yet Colombia retains one of the highest concentrations of land ownership in 
the world. Why? We show that land reform’s effects are highly bimodal. Most of Colombia’s 1100+ 
municipalities lack a landed elite.  Here, rural properties grew larger, land inequality and dispersion fell, and 
development indicators improved. But in municipalities where such an elite does exist and landholding is 
highly concentrated, such positive effects are counteracted, resulting in smaller rural properties, greater 
dispersion, and lower levels of development. We show that all of these effects – positive and negative – flow 
through local policy, which elites distort to benefit themselves. Our evidence implies that land reform’s 
second-order effects, on the distribution of local power, are more important than its first-order effects on the 
distribution of land. 
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1.  Introduction 
Land is a key asset and factor of production, and has been so since pre-historic times. Even in the twenty-
first century, land retains primary importance as a factor of production, store of wealth, and source of status. 
This is especially true in rural areas of developing countries. Influential studies have argued that land 
inequality leads to low agricultural productivity, low growth, high rates of poverty, oppressive social 
relations, and social unrest and violence (Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 1995, Mason 1998). Because of 
this, land reform has been promoted widely and for decades as a remedy for high levels of inequality, and a 
tool for modernization and social development more broadly (Kaufman1975, Lipton 2009). And yet despite 
the large number of land reforms implemented across the world, and the many studies conducted, evidence 
for land reform’s effects on not just development but, more surprisingly, land inequality is decidedly mixed. 
This is especially notable as theory supports expansive views of land reform’s potential to affect not 
just rural incomes and output, but much broader economic, social and political relations. Land reform thus 
provides not just a set of interesting questions in itself, but a useful empirical setting in which to re-examine 
broader debates about some key factors thought to explain comparative development. Recent years have seen 
a powerful resurgence in the political economy literature on development. Ideas about, for example, the role 
of institutions vs. factor endowments vs. education in driving development have been advanced forcefully, 
and have been tested in a variety of contexts. But in our view this literature, rich and provocative as it is, has 
reached empirical limits in terms of its ability to identify and distinguish amongst complex, multi-
dimensional factors. Even if the institutional intuition is correct, “institutions” are too high a level of 
aggregation to produce empirical evidence that is clear and convincing, and then compare with alterative 
theses. And the cross-country studies on which most of this literature (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson, 2001 & 2002) is based are heroic in both timescale and geographic scope. This leads to broad-
brush assumptions that obscure the many fundamental ways in which countries differ, for which we have no 
good data and hence no credible statistical controls. And they produce empirical findings that are similarly 
heroic, lacking in nuance, unable to distinguish between different aspects of the ‘institutions’ they study. 
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What is needed, instead, is an empirical approach that: (1) unpacks “institutions” into analytically 
distinct components that can be measured quantitatively, and (2) empirically tests the effects of these 
components on development with high-quality, detailed data, (3) in an empirical setting that is adequately 
identified. Once good way to achieve this is via ‘one-country, large-N analysis’ (Faguet 2012; Kroth et al. 
2016), using panel data from hundreds of observations across decades. When these units are subnational, the 
researcher can control for historical, macro-institutional, geographic, cultural, and other factors that are 
treated as exogenous in cross-country studies, and bedevil identification. The empirical quality and 
specificity of such an approach facilitates analysis that is rigorous and detailed, marked at its best by nuance 
and depth of understanding. 
This paper analyses one remarkable case of significant, sustained land reform: Colombia. Since 
independence in 1821, Colombia has implemented a nationwide land reform program based not on breaking 
up large farms, but rather transferring vacant and colonized state land to rural producers, including settlers 
and landless and poor peasants (Albertus 2015). Since 1901, Colombia granted 23 million hectares of land, 
equivalent to the total landmass of the United Kingdom, twice Greece, or six times Switzerland. And yet 
Colombia retains one of the highest levels of land inequality in the world, alongside striking disparities in 
regional and municipal development indicators. How can we explain this paradox? Focusing on the period 
1961-20105, we investigate land reform in Colombia both to answer these questions for their own sake, and 
as a tool to begin to prise open the black box of institutions and institutional change. 
A first dimension of institutions examined here is the important issue of land rights and their 
distribution. Using an original panel database comprising 1100+ municipalities over 50 years, we distinguish 
between pre-existing distributions vs. land reform-induced allocations, and investigate the effects of the 
latter on plot sizes, land inequality, and indicators of development. We then explore the channels through 
which such effects might occur, disaggregating our development indicator into its individual components, 
                                                   
5 Data availability constrains us to this period. Most of Colombia’s land reform followed Law 135 of 1961. 
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and focusing on public sector policies and investments. To our knowledge, this is the first quantitative study 
of land reform’s effects on local inequality and development in Colombia. 
Our analysis is predicated on the notion that land reform is not a simple policy instrument the main 
effects of which are first-order and mainly uni-dimensional (linear). The main effects of building more roads 
or hiring more teachers, for example, are principally to increase the efficiency and/or reach of transportation 
or education services. Knock-on effects on the nation’s politics and society may well obtain, but will be 
comparatively less important. Land reform, by contrast, is a complex instrument that sets in motion 
important changes across many dimensions of a country’s economics, politics and society. It can be expected 
to have significant effects on not just agricultural productivity and output, but also on factors further afield 
such as the distribution of status and power in society, the types and quantities of public services provided 
locally, political party competition, and amongst others. 
These effects, furthermore, will not impact municipalities symmetrically, but will rather vary across 
them as much as municipalities are themselves different from one another. This is because in each relevant 
dimension under study, the effects of land reform depend on a municipality’s characteristics. Distributing 
land in a sparsely populated, flat, lowland region on the frontier that lacks large landowners is not the same 
as doing so in the mountainous central highlands where landed elites are well established. Vastly different 
initial conditions will lead to different outcomes, and different long-term development implications. 
Colombia’s descriptive statistics bear this out, as we shall see below. 
The main heterogeneity we focus on is the extent of concentrated landholdings in a municipality. We 
capture this through our measure of latifundia – large farms of 500 hectares or more – as a proportion of a 
municipality’s total rural cadastre, normalized in per capita terms. We expect land reform to have different 
effects in municipalities with high land concentration vs. those where land is more evenly distributed. In 
practice, this proves strikingly true, and explains mixed results from 200 years of land reform in Colombia. 
Table 1 provides simple descriptive statistics for Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN), the Gini 
coefficient of land ownership, the amount of land allocated by hectares, and potential land reform – a 
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normalized proxy for allocable land that we explain in detail below – broken down into terciles by the degree 
of land concentration as measured by latifundia. The first tercile contains municipalities with the lowest 
levels of land concentration, and the third tercile contains the highest. We see that both UBN and the land 
Gini rise as we move up terciles, even as the amounts of land allocated or available for allocation rise 
significantly. The implication is that more land reform leads to lower municipal development – a surprising 
result – in a context of simultaneously increasing land concentration.  
Table 1: Unsatisfied Basic Needs, Gini, and Land Reform Summarized by Latifundia Terciles 
  
 Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Put another way, descriptive evidence suggests that Colombia contains both of the Iversen-Soskice 
types within its borders: highly unequal polities that redistribute little, and far more egalitarian polities that 
redistribute a great deal (Iversen and Soskice 2009). In such a context, can land reform have the expected 
positive effects on poverty and inequality in egalitarian municipalities, and at the same time negative effects 
where pre-existing land concentration is high? These are important, complex questions that cannot be 
answered with descriptive statistics, but require instead more rigorous econometrics. We return to them 
below. But table 1 does suggest something interesting to investigate. More generally, heterogeneity along 
these lines may also explain contradictory evidence for land reform’s effects across other countries. 
2.  Land Reform, Institutions and Development 
Our subject sits at the intersection of three large, interrelated literatures: land reform, inequality, and 
Variable Obs Mean Std.	Dev. Min Max
1st	Tercile	Latifundia
UBN 282 38.285 16.989 7.122 100.000
Gini	2010 249 0.543 0.129 0.243 0.879
Allocated	land	ha	pc 282 1.592 6.665 0.000 71.441
Potential	land	reform	ha	pc 282 1.772 4.201 0.015 60.831
2nd	Tercile	Latifundia
UBN 247 40.180 17.655 9.429 87.169
Gini	2010 227 0.632 0.100 0.339 0.876
Allocated	land	ha	pc 247 3.915 12.747 0.000 145.668
Potential	land	reform	ha	pc 247 2.220 3.675 0.097 53.814
3rd	Tercile	Latifundia
UBN 263 46.756 18.601 8.689 100.000
Gini	2010 248 0.638 0.108 0.169 0.875
Allocated	land	ha	pc 263 10.704 29.799 0.000 273.484
Potential	land	reform	ha	pc 263 5.548 15.132 0.085 215.998
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institutions, and the effects of each of these on development. These are big, rich literatures that we cannot 
pretend to summarize comprehensively here. In particular, we omit the many studies of land reform’s effects 
on agricultural investment, productivity, and yields as not directly germane to this paper. The following 
focuses on land reform’s effects on inequality and institutions, including a short section of Colombia studies. 
Following Besley, Burchardi and Ghatak (2012), we argue that land reform’s first-order effects 
concern agricultural output, productivity, profits, and tax revenues. These may tend to be positive, but will 
depend for their magnitude and even sign on a number of contextual and complementary policy variables. 
But land reform has a number of second-order effects too, and these are potentially more important. They 
operate via the changes land reform generates in underlying political and institutional relations, which in turn 
can more powerfully affect opportunity, the distribution of income, and economic growth than building more 
school or roads. In the short run, first-order effects are likely to dominate the balance of any particular land 
reform. But in the long run, such as the half-century we analyze for Colombia, second-order effects should 
be far more powerful and should easily dominate. The remainder of this paper, therefore, focuses on this 
indirect but more potent channel. 
2.1 Inequality 
Land reform’s second-order effects operate through the consequences of different distributions of 
land for political power and control of public institutions. The key concept is inequality, and a large literature 
has grown up analysing its origins and multifaceted effects. Its impacts, this literature argues, go far beyond 
conflicts over land or other asset classes, to economic growth and development more broadly. Galor et al. 
(2003, 2009) show why, beginning from first principles. 
Capital and skills are complementary in a way that land and skills are not. Rising human capital 
increases output, productivity and profits in firms, as workers’ efforts are multiplied by greater capital 
intensity and more advanced technologies. This is good not only for workers, who are more productive and 
whose wages accordingly rise, but also for firm owners and managers, as profits increase. The same 
relationship does not hold for large landowners, however. The nature of the agricultural economy is that 
 
 
6 
increasing human capital raises the wages of agricultural workers faster than their productivity, and is thus a 
profit-decreasing strategy for large landowners. Small landowners may support human capital investments 
that increase their off-farm income opportunities, as Gerbash and Siemers show (2010). But large 
landowners will tend to oppose them. This is especially true in latifundista-dominated polities, where the 
benefits of investments in public education and healthcare would be enjoyed by many but the costs borne by 
few. In such places the few will oppose such investments, and will have the power to impose their will. 
Based on this logic, Galor et al. (2003) predict that public expenditure on education will fall as land 
inequality rises, and find empirical support in cross-state data from the early-20th century US. They also 
analyse the dramatic case of Korea, where major land reform was followed by a massive increase in public 
expenditure on education. Between 1949 and 1950 family farms increased more than five-fold, from 349,000 
to 1.8 million, while tenant farm households fell from 1.1 million to virtually nothing. During the years that 
followed, government education expenditure soared from 8% to 15% of the total public budget. Because of 
the complementarities between capital and human capital, capitalists were the prime beneficiaries of rising 
human capital amongst the masses. In contrast to Marx, the authors conclude that workers and capitalists are 
natural economic allies, and landlords the principle opponents of human capital investments, economic 
development, and social mobility in society. A country’s industrial elite would rather relinquish power to the 
masses before permitting a landed elite to block development by blocking human capital investment. 
Nugent and Robinson (2010) use the cases of Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Guatemala to, 
in effect, test these ideas. All four countries displayed very similar initial conditions at independence: levels 
of development, colonial history, language, religion, climate, topography, factor endowments, technologies, 
and dominant export crops. But as they entered an export-led phase of rapid economic growth in the second 
half of the 19th-century, based largely on coffee (another shared feature), they adopted very different 
landholding structures. In Colombia and Costa Rica, coffee production was dominated by smallholder farms. 
In Guatemala and El Salvador, large coffee plantations became the rule. This difference was mostly driven 
by different laws. Colombia and Costa Rica both passed laws similar to the US 1862 Homestead act, 
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protecting smallholders and allowing them to gain title to land. In Guatemala and El Salvador, by contrast, 
powerful elites passed legislation at the onset of the coffee boom that facilitated mass land grabs. Elites 
wrested lands from freeholders and indigenous populations, and converted them into large coffee plantations 
that used extreme labor repression. Coffee production requires significant investments, the authors point out, 
for which secure private property is essential. Both sets of countries achieved this, but in completely 
different ways. 
Different legal reforms were promulgated by very different kinds of elites. From the mid-19th century 
onwards, dominant elites in Colombia and Costa Rica were mainly commercial in origin, with interests in 
manufacturing, trade, banking, and the urban economy more generally. In El Salvador and Guatemala, by 
contrast, dominant elites were large landowners heavily invested in the agricultural economy and rural 
society. These different interests generated different priorities that affected much more than property rights. 
For example, Colombia introduced universal male suffrage in the 1850s; approximately 46% of adult males 
voted in the 1856 election, a figure high by any international standard of the time. The ultimate result a 
century later is per capita GDP in Colombia and Costa Rica roughly twice that of Guatemala and El 
Salvador, levels of human development that are much higher, and institutions and practices of democracy 
that are far more robust. 
The micro-dynamics of land inequality blocking democratization are explored in much greater detail 
by Ziblatt (2008), who investigates the failed 1912 attempt to reform Prussia’s notoriously unequal 3-tier 
voting system. This system divided the electorate by tax contribution, grossly over-representing the richest 
fifteen percent of the population compared to the bottom 85 percent, in a way designed to ensure 
Conservative majorities. Legislation to adopt the one-man-one-vote standard used elsewhere in Germany 
was debated but defeated in Prussia’s legislature, largely by representatives from constituencies with high 
land inequality, who were more likely to vote against – even controlling for income inequality. Ziblatt’s 
results echo Tocqueville’s (1835) analysis of the importance of small landholders to American democracy, 
and similar arguments cast in terms of the middle class and income equality by Moore (1966) and Boix 
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(2003). Gerschenkron (1946) argues, further, that the unequal distribution of immobile assets, such as land, 
is a major impediment to democracy. This effect is analytically distinct from, and more powerful than, 
inequality of wealth. 
The logic behind this is a combination of the Meltzer-Richard (1981) model and the “special asset” 
idea. The former holds that democratization is an indirect fight over redistribution. By involving a larger 
share of the population in the exercise of power, democratization increases the chances that a rich elite will 
be expropriated. Hence the rich oppose reform. Their control over the special asset, land, permits them to get 
their way. This is because land is both fixed and highly visible. Unlike income inequality, land inequality 
underpins a particularly pernicious form of social power (Ziblatt 2008) that invests landowners with status 
and power in rural communities, giving them undue influence over public decision-making, and over the 
lives and – in extreme cases – the ideas and preferences of peasants. Mobilizing peasants to support 
democratization in such circumstances can appear to the peasants themselves as a threat to their interests. 
Hence the unequal distribution of land dampens public investment in education and other forms of human 
capital, undermines economic growth and development, sustains oligarchic rule, and represses 
democratization. 
2.2 Institutions 
New institutionalist theories of development, such as the seminal works of Engerman and Sokoloff 
(1997, 2002), Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002), are well 
known and so summarized briefly here before moving on to more recent contributions. Engerman and 
Sokoloff (henceforth ES) argue that the roots of comparative development of countries in the Americas lie in 
their factor endowments. Areas with soils and climates suitable for high-value crops, such as sugar, 
developed highly unequal political and legal systems that supported plantation agriculture based on slave 
labor, for several centuries the most efficient means of sugar production. These societies displayed severe 
levels of inequality in income and wealth, and systematic political exclusion of the masses. A similar story 
holds for mining areas, also based on slavery and forced labor. A third category of areas was sparsely 
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populated, lacked minerals, and were not suitable for plantation agriculture. These were settled by 
Europeans, who engaged in smallholder, family-based farming. They developed far more participative 
political institutions and legal systems based on equality, and far more equal distributions of income and 
wealth. The path dependency of institutions means that patterns set early in the colonial experience explain 
economic and social outcomes to this day. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (henceforth AJR) construct a similar argument, but from a 
different starting point. Because colonial lands had very different disease burdens, European considering 
emigration faced significantly different death rates. They settled in large numbers, with their families, in 
areas where chances of survival were high. These colonies developed politico-legal institutions based on 
equality and participation, as above, and relatively equal distributions of wealth. Where the chances of death 
were high, by contrast, few Europeans settled, constituting a tiny elite that exploited mineral wealth and 
plantation agriculture via slavery and forced labor. The institutions that developed in these colonies were 
exclusive, exploitative, and highly unequal. Once again, institutional path dependency explains economic 
and social outcomes today. Interestingly, this evolution involves a reversal of fortune in which the richest 
economies around 1750, based on sugar and mineral exploitation, are the poorest today, while poor 
economies founded on less-productive smallholder farms are today the richest. 
These papers reinvigorated a historical-institutionalist debate that has proved extraordinarily fruitful. 
Looking to explain Europe’s rise over the Islamic world and China during the early modern period, 
Stasavage (2014) examines the role of a distinctively European phenomenon: autonomous city-states. 
Autonomous city-states were controlled by merchant guilds, who provided greater political stability, more 
secure property rights, more training, and who more easily solved collective action problems, compared to 
princely rule. This, in turn, better supported long-term economic growth. Over time, however, strong 
property rights and high barriers to entry strangled innovation, and city-state economies stagnated. 
Examining a similar period, AJR (2005) explain Europe’s sustained growth from 1500 onwards via the 
Atlantic Ocean trade, which promoted the emergence of political institutions that provided secure property 
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rights to a broader segment of society, and allowed free entry into profitable businesses. Such changes 
occurred in European countries with access to Atlantic trade, especially the Netherlands and Britain, but not 
elsewhere in Europe – including other trading states without access to the Atlantic. Their evidence shows 
that profits from the Atlantic trade were insufficient to drive sustained growth in the countries that benefited, 
but were big enough to change the distribution of power in society. We echo this argument in our analysis of 
land and development in Colombia below. 
Naritomi et al. (2012) also show institutional path dependency, with detailed subnational data from 
Brazil. In colonial sugar plantations, polarization between landlord and slaves defined social, economic and 
political structures; in gold mining settlements, the state established rentier institutions detached from the 
local population and unresponsive to local demands, focused on taxing extraction. These patterns determine 
current development outcomes: municipalities with origins in the sugar boom have more land inequality 
today, while those with origins in the gold boom have worse governance practices and less access to justice. 
Both suffer lower provision of public goods. Bruhn and Gallego (2012) also explore colonial activities with 
subnational data, in their case from across the Latin American region. They divide the colonial economy into 
“Good” activities, characterized by low economies of scale and low population density prior to colonization; 
“Bad” activities, with high economies of scale and the heavy exploitation of labor, e.g. mining and sugar 
production; and “Ugly” activities, where large native populations were exploited in large operations that 
lacked economies of scale, relying on forced labor. Centuries later, areas with bad colonial activities have 
lower economic development, and areas with ugly activities lower GDP/capita, than areas with good or no 
activities. 
These are just a few of the many studies probing the long-term institutional determinants of both 
countries’ and subnational regions’ comparative development. They give a flavour of the recent outpouring 
of research in support of the idea that (a) institutional characteristics were set at a particular point in time – 
by factor endowments, the disease environment, or colonial powers – after which (b) these institutions 
determine levels and type of development. But the literature is not unanimous in its agreement. A number of 
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influential studies have begun to pick apart the institutional thesis, and some reject it outright. Coatsworth 
(2008) points out that ES’ reliance on natural resource endowments to explain differences in wealth between 
Latin America and North America has not held up well to scrutiny. This is true both at the macro level: 
inequalities in resource endowments and wealth vary as much within as between the two regions, and at the 
micro level: grain estates in central Mexico historically produced similar mixes of crops and animals as 
farms in, for example, Pennsylvania. 
And the ways in which AJR and ES characterize inequality of wealth, rights, and political power in 
Latin America, Coatsworth points out, is simply wrong. Spanish and Portuguese colonial societies were less 
unequal, and settler elites far less powerful, than AJR and ES claim. Creole settler elites did not control 
indigenous peasants’ access to land, for example. Surrounded and outnumbered by indigenous people and/or 
slaves, comparatively small elites had little choice but to trade loyalty to the Crown for protection. In the vast 
expanses of Spanish and Portuguese America, the authority of weak and distant monarchs depended as much 
on keeping settler elites insecure in their rights and properties as on suppressing discontent from below. The 
institutions of early colonial society were more determined by this double imperative than by factors or 
diseases. To take one important example, the New World’s legal system acted as a brake on growth not 
because it led to inequality, but because the law failed to define and extend property rights in a clear and 
coherent way, because the judicial process was very costly, slow, and thoroughly corrupt, and because it 
constrained the mobility of labor and capital by imposing a caste system (Coatsworth and Tortella 2002). 
Economic growth, when it began late in the 19th century, required not inclusive institutions, but 
rather the exclusion of majorities from political power. This consolidated the dominance of desperately 
precarious elites, so promoting investment by those elites and by foreigners. As immigration kept wages low, 
growth greatly increased the returns to physical and human capital. And so the end of the 19th century – 
when Latin America was finally growing, investing, and developing vigorously – committed the sins that 
both AJR and ES attribute to the colonial era: increasing inequality; government dominated by narrow elites; 
the exclusion of competing interests from power; poor property rights; and poor human rights protections. 
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Far from impeding growth, Coatsworth (2008) argues, these institutional features accompanied and abetted 
growth and development. 
Exploring how Latin American income per capita fell so far behind the US, Przeworski and Curvale 
(2008) also reject the inequality/inclusivity theses. In 1700, and perhaps as late as 1800, Latin American 
income levels were similar to the US. By 2000 US income levels were five times greater. What happened?  
Focusing on the periods when Latin America first fell behind, and then resumed growth at levels similar to 
the US, Przeworski and Curvale identify as the key causal mechanism not inclusive or egalitarian 
institutions, but rather institutions that establish clear rule of the game that resolve conflict. Economies grow 
when political power protects economic power – hence the importance of property rights – if conflict is 
efficiently dealt with. Political inequality can thus be consistent with healthy growth in the short term. But it 
is inefficient in the long term when exclusion leads to political crisis, undermining the rules of the game and 
hence growth. Interestingly, they also point out that land inequality does not lead to economic inequality, or 
at least not in the same degree, where land is abundant and therefore cheap, as it was in the new world. But 
inequality persists even when the assets that gave rise to it change, implying that an initially benign 
inequality can, with time, become pernicious. 
2.3 Colombia 
A rich literature on land, inequality, institutions and development in Colombia has also emerged in 
recent years, mirroring key aspects of the debates outlined above. Its findings are similarly mixed. Evidence 
on the economic effects of Colombian land reform is scarce. Assessing the land reform act of 1961, Balcázar 
et al. (2001) find that agricultural productivity increased but household income of beneficiary families fell – 
a troubling result that the authors cannot explain. Heshusius (2005), by contrast, finds positive income 
effects from improved access to credit and work training in households associated with reform. We know of 
no studies assessing the effects of reform on land concentration in Colombia. 
Acemoglu et al. (2008) find a positive relationship between land inequality in the 19th century and 
current levels of economic development across municipalities in the Colombian department of 
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Cundinamarca. Their result contradicts the negative relationship ES (and arguably AJR) imply. Likewise, 
Galán (2011) shows that municipalities in Cundinamarca with more unequal landholdings in the 19th and 20th 
centuries have higher education levels, lower poverty, and more public goods provision today. These 
findings are echoed by Dell (2008), studying modern development outcomes amongst districts in Peru and 
Bolivia that did vs. did not suffer the mita forced labor system under colonial rule. Mita districts have lower 
household consumption, lower levels of education, and less-developed road systems than those that did not. 
All three studies suggest that politics played an important intermediating role. The colonial 
government restricted the formation of Spanish latifundias in mita districts. Because latifundistas typically 
lobbied for more provision of public goods, mita districts lacked prominent advocates, and so were exploited 
in the short term and languished in the long term. And in Cundinamarca, the large majority of national and 
local politicians were large landowners. Hence municipalities with more large landowners had more 
powerful voices to demand, and more interested politicians to provide, public investments that stimulated 
long-term development there. The role of such advocates is especially important because the Colombian 
government routinely provided very few public goods before the 1930s. The state maintained a very uneven 
presence throughout Colombia’s territory, with order at the center and a more arbitrary, primitive sort of 
power punctuated by chaos and violence across much of the periphery (O’Donnell 1993, Gutiérrez 2014).6 
To a greater degree than in Europe or North America, localities abandoned by the state in Colombia 
and many other developing countries defined a stark “internal frontier” (Fajardo 2002, Machado 2013), 
creating wide disparities in long-term development across space (Boone 2012, LeGrand 1986). Might land 
reform be part of a solution? Viewed from the perspective of its second-order effects, can land reform 
catalyze a shift from a patrimonial to a liberal local order (Kohli 2004), or from closed to open-access 
institutions and organizations (North, Wallis and Weingast 2009), by empowering peasants who lack land, 
                                                   
6 Boone (2012) argues that the uneven reach of the state in Latin America and Africa is often intentional, 
serving specific political purposes, rather than being evidence of state failure. 
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and hence voice and rights? By endowing the poor with this “special asset”, could land reform alter the 
distribution of local political power so as to help peasants claim not only higher incomes, but greater voice 
and more rights? 
3.  Land Tenure and Land Reform in Colombia 
Land is distributed highly unequally in Colombia, with a concentration of ownership amongst the 
highest in the world. For two centuries, land inequality has been closely linked to rural poverty and the 
economic exclusion of the rural population (Acemoglu et al. 2008, Gutiérrez 2014). This largely explains 
Colombia’s long-standing program of land reform. But high concentrations of landholding and large estates 
– latifundia – have nonetheless endured to the present. 
The distribution of land in Colombia is deeply rooted in its colonial experience and the 19th century 
expansion of the agrarian frontier. During the colonial period, large properties emerged from the system of 
encomiendas established by the Spanish Crown. Encomiendas were royal grants that allowed the (Spanish) 
holder, the encomendero, to extract tribute and labour from indigenous people living in a particular area, in 
exchange for protecting and Christianizing them. Technically the encomienda did not assign ownership, but 
rather an inheritable right to use a piece of land. In practice, however, encomiendas were treated as private 
property, and were eventually transformed into latifundia – great estates – when landlords formalized their 
titles. At the same time, other Spanish and criollo farmers received smaller plots from the crown, creating an 
unequal, two-tiered initial distribution of land. Over time, the latter category grew steadily as Spanish-
indigenous mestizos grew from a negligible share of the population to become the majority. Initially 
outsiders, their clamour for inclusion in the country’s legal and economic life was assuaged through the sale 
of public land by the crown. As colonial encomiendas gave birth to latifundia, colonial indigenous 
reservations, resguardos, gave rise to small estates, minifundios, in particular regions, when communal lands 
were privatized to surviving indigenous populations7 (Ankersen and Rupert 2006, Colmenares 1997). As the 
                                                   
7 The relationship between proportion of latifundia in a particular municipality in 1961 and the structure of 
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indigenous population declined, many mestizos invaded resguardos and seized their land. 
Colombia was born bankrupt. The government redeemed debts accumulated during the war of 
independence by transferring public lands to private bondholders, and so a sort of land reform began at 
independence in 1821. More broadly, the defining characteristic of Colombian land reform is the transfer of 
publicly held land to landless or poor agricultural workers able to demonstrate that they have been squatting 
on vacant public lands (baldíos) for some years. Unlike other cases, such as Mexico or Bolivia, less than 
one-half of one percent of total land distributed was confiscated or purchased from large landlords. Hence 
the large estates at the top of the land distribution remained mostly unchallenged through two centuries of 
land reform. But at the same time, vast quantities of land were distributed to peasants. 
The total area of Colombia is 110 million ha. About 32 million ha are designated indigenous 
reservations, and 60 million hectares are registered as privately held property. Between 1901 and 2012, the 
state granted nearly 23 million ha of land to peasants and agricultural businesses in over 565,000 plots. This 
is equivalent to 20% of Colombia’s total area, and one-third of all privately held land. To put this in 
perspective, over the past century Colombia has distributed an amount of land equal to the total area of the 
United Kingdom, Romania, or Ghana, about twice the area of Greece or South Korea, six times the size of 
Switzerland, and seven times the size of the Netherlands. As for any country, land reform in Colombia has 
idiosyncratic characteristics. But there is no denying that reform has happened, and on a huge scale. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
the colonial institutions can be established through the following equation: 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑜/𝑀𝑢𝑛_𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎!"#! = 3.31 + 0.012 ∗ log 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 !"#$ − 0.2 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑎 −𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 − 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠. N=634, R2=0.16. 
All variables are significant at the 1% level. The equation suggests that the formation of latifundia was 
affected by two forces: a positive one driven by the availability of labor, and a negative one driven by the 
larger availability of land away from indigenous settlements. In the latter, it was observed the emergence of 
Resguardos and in the 19th  century when they were dissolved it followed the propagation of minifundia. 
 
 
16 
During the 19th century, land reform legislation focused on raising funds to pay off public debts and 
fomenting a land market. Towards the end of the century, more emphasis was placed on promoting agrarian 
development and enhancing the efficient use of land. During the 20th century, the focus shifted again towards 
resolving rural conflicts over land ownership and use. Law 200 of 1936 defined for the first time the social 
function of property, and weakened individual rights over land in order to strengthen squatters’ rights. 
Subsequent land distributions increased modestly from the very low levels of the previous decades. 
But it was not until seminal Law 135 of 1961 that land reform in Colombia went into high gear. 
Seeking to pacify and develop rural areas, improve domestic food supplies, and respond to foreign pressures 
such as the Alliance for Progress, distributions increased from about 90,000 to 600,000 ha per year; the 
number of beneficiaries more than sextupled. Land allocation slowed after 1973, and then increased again in 
the1990s as a result of institutional changes associated with the 1991 Constitution. Shifting gears again, Law 
160 of 1994 promoted a market-oriented approach to land reform that sought to lower the cost of land for 
poor peasants, and provided publicly-subsidized loans. 
Figure 1 provides time series data on yearly distributions in area and number of plots. Figure 2 shows 
the distribution of land grants in hectares between 1961-2012 by size. Interestingly, the largest two 
categories are the modest 20-200 ha range, and the larger >500 ha range. It is important to note that even a 
200 ha farm, while not small, is not large by Colombian or Latin American standards; we define latifundia, 
or large landholdings, as properties of 500 ha or more. Also, none of the laws discussed above provided full 
property titles per se, but rather Administrative Resolutions of land allocation to a private party. Obtaining 
full title thereafter was a straightforward process, but entailed nontrivial costs that many beneficiaries 
preferred not to incur. 
After over 100 years of land reform a la colombiana, two facts stand out: (1) the magnitude of 
reform has been significant, both in terms of the quantity of land distributed and the number of people 
benefiting; and (2) land inequality, and high levels of land concentration, have not decreased. As Helo and 
Ibañez (2011) point out, 42% of private land is concentrated in large properties of more than 200 ha, and the 
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Gini coefficient for land reached 0.863 in 2009. Latifundia remain a significant feature of the Colombian 
countryside, and have recently increased in size (Mora and Muñoz, 2008). One century and 23 million ha 
later, the broad structure of landholding inherited from the Spanish – a small number of large landowners 
and a large number of small landowners – remains. 
Figure 1: Land Distributions in Area (Ha) and Plots, 1901-2012 
 
Source: Information System of Rural Development, SIDER-INCODER; Authors’ calculations 
Figure 2: Land Allocation (Ha) by Plot Size, 1961-2012 
 
Source: Rural Development Information System SIDER-INCODERS. 
4.  Data and Methodology 
We examine the effects of land reform on municipal-level development and land inequality, focusing 
on its differential effects in the presence vs. absence of latifundia. We then explore possible mechanisms by 
which the concentration of landownership might cause land reform’s effects to vary. We focus on the period 
1961-2010 for two reasons: (1) although we have very detailed data on land reform going back to 1901, data 
on our dependent variables is only available at municipal level from 1973 onwards; also (2) the pace of land 
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reform increased significantly with Law 135 of 1961, as mentioned above, and so the latter half-century is 
where one would expect to find the most important effects. 
4.1 Data 
Our database combine historical data from several sources. Land reform data comes from the 
Colombian Institute of Rural Development (INCODER8), which provided individual-level data on plots and 
areas allocated in each municipality between 1961-2010. Data on UBN comes from the National Statistics 
Department, and varies between 0, when all basic needs are satisfied, and 100, when they are unsatisfied. 
Our land Gini coefficients of plot sizes and values are constructed for each municipality using rural cadastral 
data from the Augustín Codazzi Geographic Institute (IGAC) for 1985, 1993, 2005 and 2010. Average plot 
size and the coefficient of variation of plot sizes are constructed from the same data, as are distributional data 
on plots by various ranges of size. Lastly, variables for the extent of latifundia and its share of the total rural 
cadastre are calculated from IGAC data from 1960. Latifundia are defined as properties of 500 ha or more. 
All per capita values are calculated using lagged population data from the national census.9 
Appendix 1 presents summary statistics of the variables used in our estimations. Land reform has 
taken place in almost all Colombian municipalities, and the average size of rural properties is 47 ha. Average 
land inequality is high, at 0.69, and in some municipalities reaches extremely high values of 0.98 for both 
plot size and value. Medium size properties account for about 40% of rural land, latifundia for 37%, and 
small properties for 33%. The average municipality in 1960 had 13,445 ha of latifundia, representing 14% of 
rural property. But dispersion is very high, with latifundia in 1960 ranging from 0 ha to as much as 1.45 
million ha and 98.8% of all land in a municipality. 
4.2 Methodology 
To determine the effects of land reform on development and inequality, we would like to estimate 
                                                   
8 Acronyms of Colombian institutions are given in the Spanish original. 
9 Population growth might credibly be driven by the reality, or prospect, of land allocations in a municipality. 
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𝑦!" = 𝛿! + 𝑑! + 𝛾!PLRpc!" + 𝛾! PLRpc!" ∗ L1960! + 𝛾!L1960! ∗ 𝑑! + 𝛾!𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂! ∗ 𝑑! + 𝜀!"  , (1) 
where dependent variable y represents development and inequality outcomes of interest. We use Unsatisfied 
Basic Needs (UBN) as our key measure of development; as measures of land inequality we use the land Gini 
coefficient of plot sizes and values, the average size of rural properties, and the coefficient of variation of 
plot sizes. Variables 𝛿 and 𝑑 are municipal and year fixed effects, respectively. L1960i is per capita 
latifundia (larger than 500 hectares) in 1960, previous to the land reform of 1961, capturing the relative size 
of large landholdings in municipality i. This variable captures the prevalence of latifundia, and the relative 
power of the landed elite in a municipality prior to land reform. The Area term is a scalar or vector of first 
and second-degree polynomials of municipal area interacted with time fixed effect d, which permits a 
reduced-form control for the direct effect of land availability on local development and land distribution. 
And 𝜀!"  is the error term. All variables are subscripted by municipality i and year t. 
Our key policy variable is land reform. But we cannot introduce simple indicators of land reform 
(plots, ha, or per capita) as regressors in this equation because of the endogeneity bias that would result. As 
land reform policies have aimed to reduce poverty, improve land inequality, and increase rural development, 
it is likely that land reform actions at the local level have been largely driven by poverty and inequality. 
Naïve OLS estimates would thus produce biased estimators. To correct for this, we construct an exogenous 
measure of land reform called Potential Land Reform per capita, PLRpc. This variable distributes the total 
land area allocated each year in Colombia in proportion to each municipality’s area, correcting the latter for 
previous years’ distributions. To construct PLR, we first calculate Potential Land Allocable: 
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!" = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎!𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  ! 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎 𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠!" ∗ 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑!  
Corrected area captures the total area of the municipality corrected by previous land allocations. The 
correction involves two steps: (i) for each municipality, an area is discounted equal to its proportional share 
of national allocations (not real allocations there); and (ii) areas are corrected only in municipalities where 
actual allocations took place between years t-1 and t. Our concept of land allocable for land reform is thus 
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based on national, and not local, trends. Corrected municipal area is defined as follows: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎!,! =  𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎!,!!! − 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑!,!!! ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎!,!!!   
Potential Land Reform per capita is thus defined as municipality i’s total allocable land summed 
between 1961 and year t, expressed in lagged per capita terms: 
𝑃𝐿𝑅𝑝𝑐!,! =  𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒!,!!!"#! /𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!,!!! . 
It can be interpreted as the intensity of the intent-to-treat, given national land reform trends and the quantity 
of land available in a particular municipality. Figure 3 shows correlations between actual and potential 
accumulated hectares of land reform for 1973 and 2010. We see that Potential Land Reform is a good, but 
not perfect, predictor of real land reform – a desirable characteristic for an exogenous proxy. 
Figure 3: Potential and Actual Land Reform Allocations 
  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
We expect the coefficients on PLRpc to be negative for estimates of poverty or land inequality, 
implying that land reform benefits poorer populations and improves the distribution of land – i.e. the first-
order effects of land reform obtain. Land reform’s second-order effects, operating through changes in 
political power and public institutions, should over time increase these trends. We test these ideas in a 
second set of estimations, explained below. We expect the coefficient on latifundia to be positive for both 
poverty and land inequality, in accordance with the literature reviewed above. This implies that where land is 
highly concentrated, elites are able to either capture land reform for their own benefit, or capture local 
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institutions in ways that benefit them at the expense of the poor. In such places, the positive effects of land 
reform will be undermined. Following the same logic, we expect the coefficient on the interaction of PLRpc 
and latifundia to be positive for both as well. 
Our specification is parsimonious, with few controls. We omit other commonly-used controls, such 
as indicators of education, health, and tax revenues, or political and violence variables, due to probable 
endogeneity and/or multicollinearity. We estimate for 1100 municipalities over the period 1961-2010. 
In order to investigate the deeper mechanisms by which any effects identified in equation (1) occur, 
we further estimate a variation of (1) substituting dependent variable pit for yit, where pit denotes individual 
components of UBN, such as the proportion of people with inadequate housing or public utilities. We 
interpret these as indicators of poverty that are particularly susceptible to public policy. We also estimate 𝑒! = 𝜁! + 𝛾!PLRpc! + 𝛾! PLRpc! ∗ L1960! + 𝛾!L1960! ∗ 𝑑! + 𝛾!𝑨𝒓𝒆𝒂! ∗ 𝑑! + 𝒁𝒊 + 𝜀!  , (2) 
where e is different measures of local agricultural expenditure in municipality i, ζ  are department and 
regional fixed effects, Z is a vector of standard geographic controls, and remaining variables are defined as 
above. Due to a lack of time-series data for local expenditure, we estimate this equation as a cross-sectional 
regression. The logic of both sets of regressions is to investigate how land reform and latifundia interact to 
affect the sorts of local policies that might accelerate local development and reduce poverty. In other words, 
how are rural elites are benefiting from land reform in areas where they predominate? Are local public 
policies systematically different in such municipalities, compared to those where land is not concentrated? 
5.  Results: Land Reform, Latifundia, Inequality and Development 
Inequality 
How did land reform affect inequality? Models 1 and 2 in Table 2 show that land reform decreases 
the Gini coefficient of plot sizes and plot values; both coefficients are significant at the one percent level. 
The land reform-latifundia interaction term is insignificant in both equations. Model 3 shows that land 
reform increases the average size of rural properties, a result significant at the one percent level. But the land 
reform-latifundia interaction term is negative and statistically significant also at the one percent level, 
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implying a countervailing effect. Model 4 shows that land reform decreases the coefficient of variation of 
plot sizes – a measure of the dispersion of overall landholdings. The land reform-latifundia interaction term 
is again statistically insignificant. Additional control variables for area, a simple latifundia term, and 
municipal fixed effects are included, all of which behave as expected. 
Table 2: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Land Inequality 
 
These results imply that land reform in Colombia decreased inequality in landholdings between 
1961-2010. The estimated effect of a one-log-unit increase in land reform (in hectares per capita) is a 
reduction of 0.02 points of the land Gini. Keeping in mind that the Gini ranges between 0 and 1, this effect, 
though not very large, is significant. Put another way, an increase of one standard deviation in land reform 
decreases the Gini coefficient of plot sizes by 0.029 points (=1.46*0.02), equivalent to 27 percent of its 
standard deviation, or four percent of its mean. Interestingly, the presence of concentrated landholdings – 
and the rural elites they imply – do not seem to affect either measure of land inequality. Our indicator of 
dispersion shows a similar pattern. A one-standard-deviation increase in land reform decreases the 
coefficient of variation by 0.31 units, equivalent to nine percent of its mean or 22 percent of its standard 
deviation. 
Land reform also affects the average size of landholdings, but here the effect is positive. An increase 
of one standard deviation in land reform increases average plot size by 0.27 log units, or 1.31 ha; this is 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Potential	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc	(Log) -0.0200*** -0.0182*** 0.186*** -0.211***
(-0.00674) (-0.00619) (-0.021) (-0.0478)
Potential	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc*Latifundia	pc	(Log) 0.00335 0.00694 -0.0555*** 0.0451
(-0.00551) (-0.00506) (-0.017) (-0.0385)
Constant -2,027 -2,577 16.54*** 16.52
(-4056) (-3723) (-6046) (-13.75)
Interaction	Latifundia*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second	degree	polynomial	of	area	of	municipalities Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average	Proportion	allocated Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1628 1628 3164 3164
R-squared 0.02 0.021 0.365 0.082
Number	of	cod_mpio 814 814 814 814
Panel	estimates	with	municipal	and	year	fixed	effects;	Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
Gini	Coefficient	
of	Plot	Sizes
Gini	
Coefficient	
of	Plot	
Values
Average	Size	of	
Rural	Properties	
(Log)
Coefficient	of	
Variation	of	Plot	
Sizes
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equivalent to nine percent of its mean, or 22 percent of its standard deviation. The presence of latifundistas, 
however, mostly counters this effect. Our results suggest that a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
interaction term decreases the average size of rural properties by 0.09 log units (=0.056*1.53), equivalent to 
1.09 ha, three percent of its mean, or seven percent of its standard deviation. The concentration of 
landholding thus counteracts most of the beneficial effects of land reform on average plot size. 
Table 3 probes the distributional effects of land reform further by estimating its effects on per capita 
landholdings across various size categories. We see that land reform increases landholdings in all of the size 
categories except the largest, corresponding to latifundia. The biggest coefficient is for the 20-200 ha range, 
followed by the 3-10 ha range. All of these coefficients are significant at the one percent level. But in 
standardized terms, we see larger effects in the smaller categories: an increase of one standard deviation in 
land reform increases the number of plots smaller than three ha by 0.219 log units, equivalent to 183 percent 
of its mean. Standardized effects for 3-10 and 10-20 ha/capita are 148 percent and 120 percent of their 
means, respectively. 
Table 3: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on the Structure of Landholding 
 
The latifundia interaction term is similarly significant at the five and one percent levels, but with 
signs that change in a way that is telling. The interaction term is positive for all four largest size categories – 
including latifundia – but negative for the two smallest size categories. These results imply that land reform 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES
<3	ha/capita	
(log)
3-10	
ha/capita	
(log)
10-20	
ha/capita	
(log)
20-200	
ha/capita	
(log)
200-500	
ha/capita	
(log)
>500	
ha/capita	
(log)
Potential	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc	(Log) 0.150*** 0.212*** 0.164*** 0.322*** 0.0801*** 0.0251
(0.00597) (0.00892) (0.00843) (0.0202) (0.0125) (0.0224)
Potential	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc* -0.0339*** -0.0185** 0.0174** 0.0810*** 0.0922*** 0.105***
Latifundia	pc	(Log) (0.00487) (0.00728) (0.00688) (0.0165) (0.0102) (0.0183)
Constant 6.090* 4.344 -1.540 -11.66 -2.668 11.47*
(3.587) (5.361) (5.064) (12.13) (7.483) (6.645)
Interaction	Latifundia*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Second	degree	polynomial	of	municipal	area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average	Proportion	allocated Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627 1,627
R-squared 0.465 0.466 0.427 0.404 0.309 0.126
Number	of	cod_mpio 814 814 814 814 814 814
Panel	estimates	with	municipal	and	year	fixed	effects;	Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
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increased per capita landholdings across small, medium and large landholdings, but most strongly amongst 
medium-large properties of 20-200 ha. This effect is complemented by the latifundia effect above 10 
ha/capita, but counteracted below that threshold. It is notable that the latifundia effect exceeds the pure land 
reform effect for the largest two categories, both as coefficients and in standardized terms. 
Development 
Table 4 examines the effects of land reform and latifundia on municipal-level development, 
measured by the relatively broad measure of Unsatisfied Basic Needs.10 Equations 1-3 test alternative 
specifications of our basic model as a robustness check. Land reform is negative and statistically significant 
at the one percent level in all three. Once again the land reform-latifundia interaction term has the opposite 
sign, and is statistically significant at the one percent level. Other variables behave as expected. 
 Table 4: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Local Development 
 
By decreasing unsatisfied basic needs, land reform is associated with increasing local development. 
A one-log-unit-increase in land reform is associated with a 3.9 unit reduction in UBN. To put this in context, 
a one-standard-deviation increase in land reform would be expected to decrease UBN by 5.63 points, 
equivalent to nine percent of its mean or 37 percent of it standard deviation. But once again, these effects are 
largely undone by concentrated landholdings. A one-standard-deviation increase in the latifundia interaction 
                                                   
10 As compared, for example, to local measures of income per capita or tax receipts. 
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES UBN UBN UBN
Potential	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc	(Log) -1.733*** -3.857*** -2.942***
(0.467) (0.559) (0.546)
Potential	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc*Latifundia	(Log) 2.179*** 1.404***
(0.353) (0.353)
Constant -200.3 78.77*** 226.8
(130.8) (0.773) (177.7)
Average	Proportion	allocated Yes Yes Yes
Interaction	Latifundia*Year No Yes Yes
Polynomial	of	area*year No No Yes
Second	degree	polynomial	of	municipal	area No No Yes
Observations 3,260 3,260 3,260
R-squared 0.835 0.824 0.838
Number	of	cod_mpio 815 815 815
Panel	estimates	with	municipal	and	year	fixed	effects;	Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
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term drives UBN back up by 3.3 points, equivalent to five percent of its mean, or fifteen percent of its 
standard deviation. 
Summary 
Taken together, our results imply that the effects of land reform in Colombia are not symmetric 
across municipalities, but rather heterogeneous. As theory suggests, the effects of reform vary significantly 
with context. On its own, land reform decreases land inequality, increases average plot size, and decreases 
dispersion in the distribution of land ownership. It does so not by breaking up large farms – Colombia’s 
reform did not work that way – but rather by increasing the lower and middle ranges of the distribution. In so 
doing, it alters that distribution from a bimodal one – with peaks at the extremes, a “missing middle”, and a 
high degree of dispersion – towards a more normal, more even distribution. Land reform also improves local 
development. Impressively, our estimates imply that the magnitude of this effect in standardized terms rivals 
the effect on land inequality. Land reform reduces unsatisfied basic needs, a measure of development that 
naturally prioritizes poorer Colombians. This is a notable finding given that any reasonable chain of causality 
would link land reform more tightly to land inequality than to broader, multidimensional measures of 
development. 
But the presence of latifundia – concentrated landholdings – undermines this, reducing land reform’s 
effects on average plot size, number of plots in smaller categories, and development. These counter-effects 
are significant in size. Our results imply that latifundia counteracts 59 percent of the beneficial effects of 
land reform on development, and 83 percent of the effect on average plot size. It appears that large 
landowners are able to either prevent the benefits of reform from flowing to their intended beneficiaries, or – 
perhaps – capture these benefits for themselves. 
These results are point estimates at average values for all municipalities. If our overarching finding is 
that pre-existing inequality strongly mediates the effects of land reform, then we need to know more. At 
what thresholds of inequality do land reform’s effects switch from positive to negative for the variables we 
estimate? When does land reform improve inequality and development and when does it make things worse? 
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The graphs that follow answer these questions by calculating the incremental effects of land reform vs. land 
concentration separately on Colombian municipalities decile by decile. We recalculate our canonical 
equation using coefficients estimated above and decile averages to calculate estimated ŷ values for each 
decile of Colombian municipalities ranked by latifundia. By alternately setting the land reform and the 
interaction terms to zero and subtracting ŷ values, we can easily estimate incremental effects of land reform 
and latifundia on each dependent variable. 
Figure 4 shows the incremental effects of land reform and latifundia, as well as the net effect (blue 
line, discussed above), on the Gini coefficient of land ownership. Land reform decreases inequality 
throughout the distribution, but does so more strongly in the higher deciles of land concentration – where the 
underlying problem it seeks to remedy is greater – as we would expect. Latifundia has no effect in the lower 
deciles, again as we would expect since its value there is zero or very low. But above the 8th decile latifundia 
has a sharply increasing effect that raises the Gini coefficient by 0.011, countering fully half the beneficial 
effect of land reform in decile 10. 
Figure 4: Estimated Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Gini 
  
Figure 5 shows the incremental effects of land reform and latifundia on different categories of plot 
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sizes. Land reform’s strongest effects are on the smallest size category, <3 ha, quickly becoming negative 
thereafter. But, curiously, the effects of land reform rise above 200 ha, approaching zero again for plots 
above 500 ha. The effects of latifundia, by contrast, are negative and small for the smallest plot sizes, but 
become positive above 10 ha and large above 20 ha. The net effect is broadly U-shaped: land reform 
increases landholding in the smallest and largest categories, and reduces in in the middle categories. 
Figure 5: Estimated Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on the Structure of Landholding 
  
Figure 6 shows the incremental effects of land reform and latifundia on local development. Land 
reform decreases UBN throughout, thereby increasing development; it does so most strongly in the highest 
deciles, especially the 10th. Latifundia has an almost-mirror image opposite effect, initially zero, then rising 
slowly through decile 7, and accelerating thereafter; by decile 9 latifundia counters 85 percent of land 
reform’s beneficial effect on local development; in decile 10 latifundia counters 136 percent of land reform’s 
beneficial effect. In these municipalities, additional increments of land reform decrease inequality by only 
half as much as elsewhere, and actually worsen local development. It is no wonder that a century of land 
reform has done so little to reduce land inequality and poverty rates in Colombia. 
How does land reform achieve these effects?  And how does latifundia undo them? Does reform 
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affect development by changing the distribution of land assets, assuming the latter is its first-order effect? Or 
is there an independent public sector channel, as theory suggests? A number of the components of the UBN 
indicator – especially access to education, water, sanitation, health care, and electricity – imply that the 
public sector must be involved. And does latifundia counteract the effects of land reform by intervening in 
the distribution of land only, or by additionally altering public policy and the distribution of public 
expenditure? Our evidence thus far permits only speculation. The next section investigates the channels of 
land reform’s effects in more detail. 
Figure 6: Estimated Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Local Development 
  
Mechanisms 
Table 5 explores the effects of land reform and latifundia on municipal-level agriculture expenditure. 
The vast majority of Colombian municipalities are rural, economically dominated by agricultural activities. 
This is true today, and more true the further back in time we go. Hence agricultural policy is quite important 
for promoting economic and social development; one good way to measure this is via local agricultural 
expenditure. Ideally we would look at other areas of expenditure too, but for other sectors data is available 
for too few municipalities to make this feasible. In addition, a lack of time-series data obliges us to estimate 
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these as cross-sectional regressions. Hence we present two measures of agricultural expenditure, each 
estimated with two sets of controls, as robustness checks. Our results are consistent across these 
specifications. In our view, equation 4 is our best model of agricultural expenditure. 
Agriculture expenditure increases with land reform as a proportion of both total expenditure and total 
investment. All our estimates are significant at the one percent level. Hence land reform increases 
agricultural investment measured as a share of the budget. But the presence of concentrated landholdings in 
the form of latifundia once again counters this effect. In all four models, the latifundia interaction term is 
negative and statistically significant at the one and five percent levels, with coefficients an order of 
magnitude smaller than those for land reform. Once more, therefore, the latifundia effect reduces that of land 
reform, decreasing agriculture investment where large landholders predominate. Other control variables 
behave as expected. 
Table 5: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Local Agricultural Expenditure 
 
How exactly does land reform affect development? Table 6 investigates the effects of land reform on 
disaggregated components of the UBN index. These can be thought of as separating development into 
private vs. public goods elements. The results show that land reform decreases the proportion of people 
living in overcrowded conditions. Reform also decreases the number of households living in structures built 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES
Agriculture	
expenditure/
Total	
expenditure
Agriculture	
expenditure
/Total	
investment
Agriculture	
expenditure/
Total	
expenditure
Agriculture	
expenditure/
Total	
investment
Potencial	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc	(Log) 0.00174*** 0.00198*** 0.00160*** 0.00180***
(0.000333) (0.000390) (0.000353) (0.000415)
Potencial	Land	Reform-Hectares	pc*Latifundia	pc	(Log) -0.000488** -0.000572** -0.000489*** -0.000569**
(0.000189) (0.000222) (0.000189) (0.000222)
Constant 0.0806*** 0.0948*** 0.0790*** 0.0923***
(0.0151) (0.0177) (0.0155) (0.0182)
Latifundia	(log) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region	fixed	effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average	area	allocated Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial	of	area Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic	controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 752 752 743 743
R-squared 0.182 0.191 0.199 0.208
Cross-sectional	OLS;	Standard	errors	in	parentheses
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
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with inadequate materials. Reform decreases the population with inadequate water, sanitation and electricity 
services (“public utilities”). And reform decreases the proportion of the population that did not attend school. 
These results are mostly significant at the one and five percent levels. 
As before, the presence of latifundia reduces these effects in six of the eight models estimated. 
Latifundia increases the population with inadequate housing, inadequate access to water, sanitation and 
electricity services, and increases the rate of educational non-attendance. Two of these coefficients are 
significant at the one, two at the five, and two at the ten percent levels; latifundia is insignificant for 
overcrowding. Hence land reform on average promotes development across both its private and public 
dimensions, improving housing conditions and access to basic services. But the presence of concentrated 
landholdings counters these beneficial effects for the quality of housing materials, access to primary services, 
and educational non-attendance. Our results are robust to changes in specification from varying control 
variables. 
Table 6: Effects of Land Reform and Latifundia on Independent UBN Components 
 
6.  Conclusion 
Colombia has pursued land reform since Independence, distributing vast quantities of land mainly to 
landless and poor peasants. What effects did this have on inequality and development? These questions are 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Population	
overcrowded	
(percent)
Population	
overcrowd
ed	
(percent)
Population	
with	
inadequate	
housing	
(percent)
Population	
with	
inadequate	
housing	
(percent)
Population	
with	
inadequate	
public	
utilities	
(percent)	+
Population	
with	
inadequate	
public	
utilities	
(percent)
School	non-
attendance	
(percent)
School	non-
attendance	
(percent)
Potential	land	reform	ha	pc	(log) -1.205** -1.041* -2.841*** -2.037** -6.631*** -4.878*** -1.503*** -0.964**
(0.554) (0.555) (0.866) (0.861) (0.984) (1.046) (0.379) (0.397)
Potential	land	reform	ha	pc* -0.0735 0.185 1.814*** 1.071* 2.394*** 1.622** 0.479* 0.601**
Latifundia	pc	(log) (0.376) (0.394) (0.589) (0.613) (0.700) (0.742) (0.270) (0.281)
Constant 60.98*** 306.9 43.49*** 729.7** 46.64*** 606.1*** 8.820*** 49.37
(0.791) (212.2) (1.234) (329.3) (1.387) (166.5) (0.534) (63.11)
Interaction	Latifundia*Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Average	area	allocated Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Geographic	controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Polynomial	of	area*year No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,090 3,090 3,113 3,113 3,113 3,113 3,113 3,113
R-squared 0.884 0.887 0.640 0.654 0.632 0.638 0.285 0.319
Number	of	cod_mpio 806 806 806 806 806 806 806 806
Panel	estimates	with	municipal	and	year	fixed	effects;	Standard	errors	in	parentheses
"Public	utilities"	is	a	composite	of	water,	sanitation	and	electricity	services	
***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1
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interesting not just for their own sake, but because they shed light on larger questions concerning the effects 
of specific institutional features, such as inequality, on development. Our evidence shows that land reform 
had heterogeneous effects in Colombia. On average, land reform increased the size of rural properties, 
decreased land inequality, decreased dispersion in the distribution of landholdings, and reduced poverty. But 
the presence of latifundia – concentrated landholdings – in some municipalities significantly counters these 
beneficial effects, resulting in smaller rural properties, more dispersed landholdings, and lower levels of 
development. 
By what mechanism did these effects came about? One channel is public policy. Land reform 
increased public investment in important areas such as agriculture, which promotes economic growth and 
well-being. This led to improvements in households’ consumption of private goods such as housing, and 
publicly-provided primary services such as education, health, water and sanitation and electricity. But the 
presence of concentrated land ownership counteracted these effects once again, decreasing agriculture 
expenditure, and worsening outcomes in housing and primary services. 
Land reform in Colombia had the intended first-order effects of reducing land inequality and 
dispersion, and placing more land in the hands of poorer farmers. Such changes to a key factor of production 
and the distribution of wealth are important in a developing country with a large agricultural sector like 
Colombia. But it is land reform’s secondary effects – changes in the distribution of power, probably by 
increasing the wealth and status of beneficiaries – that are ultimately more important. In many Colombian 
municipalities, these took the form of long-term changes in decision-making and patterns of governance; 
public institutions reacted as one would expect in a democracy, providing more public goods to a wider share 
of the population, so spurring development. 
Such benign effects followed land reform in municipalities where the initial distribution of land – 
and hence we assume wealth and status – was not highly skewed from the start. But in municipalities where 
land ownership was skewed, elites seem to have succeeded in twisting the public policy process such that the 
benefits of land reform – beginning with the land itself – flowed to a smaller, and not larger, share of the 
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population. Inequality and dispersion in the distribution of land increased as a result, average plot size fell, 
and large landholdings increased further in number. Municipalities of this type invested less in rural public 
and private goods, leading to worsening indicators of local development. In such places, it is important to 
note, land was also distributed. But it was given out in patterns, leading to broader outcomes, that were very 
different indeed. 
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